Limiting Retainage Through Amending the Contractor Prompt Payment Act

Joshua Glazov over at the Construction Law Attorney Blog has an April 23, 2009, posting about Illinois House Bill 344 which, as introduced, would amend the Illinois Contractor Prompt Payment Act to limit, on a percentage basis, the amount of retainage legally allowed under construction contracts to contractors and subs.

The bill passed the house with the percentage provisions intact and the Illinois Senate now has amended the bill to include a definition of retainage:

(d) "Retainage" means funds that are earned by the contractor but not paid until some agreed upon date, such as the completion of the job.

The senate amendment also eliminates the percentage restrictions on outright retainage and instead has proposed making this bill a restriction on retainage for materials:

(b) Under a construction contract, it is unlawful to withhold retainage on materials required for completion of the construction contract that are delivered to a job site and are billed in accordance with the periodic payments in the construction contract.

This  provision is interesting given that the bill could alter the general nature of invoices by allowing those parties that do not distinguish between materials and labor in their payment applications to parse out the two and demand payment for the materials listed in the  payment applications leaving the owner without recourse to its contract's retainage provision for those payments.

CLAB’s posting lists and links to some advocacy groups that can be contacted to comment on the bill.

How Should a Court Determine Damages If My Contract Is Breached?

O'Connor Construction Company v. Belmont Harbor Home Development is a classic case in construction dispute damages. The plaintiff filed a mechanics lien against a condominium project after the developer refused to let it complete the project. O'Connor had been the carpentry subcontractor responsible for blocking and for trim finishing. It completed most of its work under its contract and had been asked to work, contrary to the contract, to finish the units as units were sold rather than finishing the project as a whole.

After a dispute over payment applications, O'Connor requested that the developer deliver the materials it needed to complete the project in a timely fashion, and the developer failed to supply the needed materials in a timely way. O'Connor then filed a mechanics lien for the amount it was owed under its contract and refused the developer's demand to rescind the lien. When O'Connor would not rescind its lien, the general contractor terminated the contract with O'Connor.

The facts in the trial court showed that O'Connor's contract price plus extras was $351,989.00. This is what O’Connor would have been paid under its contract if the contract had been completed. It also showed that O'Connor had been paid $175,189.50. The trial court found that O'Connor had substantially completed its contract and that the cost to finish the contract for work that was not performed after O’Connor was let go was $41,200. Using a method of calculating damages that would award damages for the benefit received by the developer from O'Connor's work, the trial court found that O'Connor was owed $50,876.50. On appeal, the appellate court found that this was the wrong measure for damages in both a mechanics lien action and a breach-of-contract action.

The appellate court found that the proper measure of damages owed to O'Connor would be $351,989.00 O'Connor would have received had it been allowed to finish the project minus the $175,189.50 that O'Connor had been paid, and also less the $41,200 it would cost the defendants to finish the work O'Connor was in not allowed to complete. This is in stark contrast with the $50,876.50 figure the trial court had awarded. The appellate court also found that under the mechanics lien statute O'Connor was allowed its attorneys fees where a portion of the payment that O'Connor was owed had not been turned over, and the defendants testified that it was due to O'Connor.

Also worth noting in the opinion is the fact that the mechanics lien statute provides interest at 10% per annum, which was greater than the 5% per annum O'Connor could expect under its contract. As we’ve said before, along with the Contractor Prompt Payment Act the mechanics Lien act provides any party who has not been paid a powerful tool and obtaining payment for services rendered. Knowing that in a fixed-price contract, there is a certain expectation you may have when someone else breaches your contract, using the mechanics in statute to get that payment back allows you a remedy that you otherwise might not have… and awards damages in a manner similar to contractual damages and possibly not just for damages in line with the benefit someone has received from your work.

In a day and age when attorneys fees can become a considerable hindrance to the prospect of recovering on low-cost contracts – it is worth noting that payment held without just cause can  entitle someone to remuneration for the fees of having to bring a court action under the statute.

Why Shouldn't You Rely on Certificates of Insurance As Proof of Additional Insured Coverage?

 

We've warned before about the recent dangers of relying on a certificate of insurance as proof of your coverage as an additional insured. In the United Underwriters article, we wrote about the exclusionary language contained in a certificate insurance and its interpretation. In the recent case of Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Mona Fabrication et al., we again find the issue of a policy's interpretation regarding additional insured coverage.

In Nautilus, the court was confronted with the issue of whether or not a party not named as an additional insured in an endorsement could nonetheless be included as an additional insured where the endorsement also stated that additional insureds are those “as required by written contract and per certificate of insurance as approved and on file with the company” and a contract existed requiring the company be named as an additional insured but no certificate of insurance was on file with the insurance company.

Mona, along with the Muslim Community Center and others were sued in a personal injury action that occurred during construction on the Muslim Community Center. The Muslim Community Center along with others tendered to Mona's insurance company and the insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it did not owe Muslim Community Center and others coverage or defense.

In assessing the policy language cited above, the court found that where there was no evidence that both an insurance certificate was on file with the insurance company and Mona was required to name the Muslim Community Center as an additional insured by contract, therefore the policy precluded coverage for the Muslim Community Center.

As we said before it's likely that the best policy is to make sure you're named in the endorsement. However, if the endorsement requires something as simple as contractual language stating that you should be named as an additional insured along with making sure a certificate is on file with the company, you should also ensure that a certificate is on file with the company and make sure your contractual language is sufficient.

It is becoming increasingly rare that an insurance certificate is found to be proof that one is actually covered as an additional insured under a policy.  With a small amount of due diligence, this problem can be alleviated.

 

New Suit Fridays 5-01-2009

 

There are a few interesting cases for today.

In what is sure to be a case you’ll want to follow… the complaint in Weatherguard Construction Company, Inc. et al. v. John Does 1-18 is brought by construction companies against posters to a comment section on the website Topix.com for allegedly defamatory remarks and postings about the companies. The complaint includes the comments as well as the IP addresses of many of the posters. In a count for interference with a prospective business relationship, the complaint sets out other comments from the thread which allegedly show people indicating they would not be using the services of the companies after reading the website. The Cook County Clerk of Court’s website lists another case between Weatherguard and Topix.

This complaint in Burns v. GFGR, Inc. et al, alleges breach of contract, professional negligence, consumer fraud and conspiracy arising out of a transaction for the purchase of property. The plaintiffs, real estate investors, are suing, among others, an engineering firm and a real estate agent after they had to pay money to repair a building they bought that had allegedly been inspected at plaintiffs’ request by the engineering firm and found “structurally sound.” Plaintiffs claim they relied on the report prepared by the engineers when they agreed to purchase the building and later were cited by the City of Chicago for code violations including “an unstable West wall structure, rotting columns, beams and insufficient structural support of the rear porch and a front balcony lacking sufficient structural support.” The docket is here. The breach of contract claim seeks damages that include reimbursement for the “lost market opportunity in that Plaintiffs was [sic] unable to take advantage of selling 1619 West Carmen in a favorable real estate market due to delays caused by remediation of the material structural deficiencies mandated by the City of Chicago.”

The complaint in American Builders and Contractors Supply Co., Inc. v. Singles Roofing Company, et al, is brought by a supply company that was charged a $132,752.99 restocking fee by a third-party vendor when a roofing company allegedly cancelled its order. The supply company received a refund, but the restocking fee was a cost they apparently had to pay. The complaint contains counts for fraud, breach of contract and detrimental reliance.

Alleged construction defects led to the complaint in Sundararaj v. Kot. Plaintiffs claim they hired the defendant to build them a $930,000 house in accordance with “certain plans and specifications” and closed on the home in October of 2005. In 2006 and 2007 some leaks were noticed and the leaks were taken care of, in 2008 the plaintiffs noticed “a musty smell in multiple rooms” and had the property evaluated, the result of the evaluation: an allegation of “serious problems” with the construction of the property and are listed in the complaint at paragraph 15. They include the lack of a vapor barrier behind the drywall for the exterior walls, lack of proper flashing at parts of the roof, elevated mold levels and top floor bedrooms with a +20% moisture reading using a TRAMEX moisture meter. The complaint is for breach of contract.

The complaint in Studio D Architecture LLC v. Maresso et al alleges that a former employee of the architecture firm set up a competing company before he ceased working for the plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that the defendant misappropriated proprietary information including computer files, created false files on the plaintiff’s computer system and disabled their website. The trade secret count alleges that several other defendants used the proprietary information and that they knew it was proprietary since the defendant was not an architect.

 

When Must I Procure Insurance Covering Another For Their Negligence

Answer: When your contract obligates you to do so.

We’ve all seen the terms in our contracts, this one is particular to leases:

INSURANCE. (a) Tenant shall, at its sole cost and expense, maintain at all times with responsible insurance carriers acceptable to Landlord licensed to do business in the State of Illinois, insurance covering the premises for the mutual benefit of Landlord and Tenant as follows:

*** (v) Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, with such limits as may be reasonably requested by Landlord from time to time, but not less than a $5,000,000.00excess liability for bodily injury and property damage;

*** (c) All insurance policies shall name Landlord *** [and others] as additional insureds, as their respective interests may appear. Landlord may, by written notice to Tenant, designate other parties as additional insureds. All such insurance shall provide that:

(i) The coverage provided includes the premises;

***(iii) All losses shall be payable notwithstanding any act or negligence of Tenant or Landlord or the occupation or use of the premises for purposes more hazardous than permitted by terms of such policy.

That last part is important. In Illinois, most agreements to indemnify someone for their own negligence are void as a matter of public policy, however, agreeing to obtain insurance to cover someone’s negligence is not void. In fact, it creates an enforceable contract and if you fail to obtain it, even by way of your insurance company providing a policy that excludes it, you’ve breached the lease (or any contract with such a provision for that matter) and can be held liable for the damages that result from failing to obtain the insurance.

In Clarendon America Insurance Co. v. Prime Group Realty, Inc. (1st Dist., Doc. No. 1-08-0791 & 1985 cons.) that’s exactly what happened. The facts are that Prime Group was the lessor to an entity named Ala Carte Entertainment that ran a restaurant on the property. The lease between the two included the provision above as well as multiple provisions stating that Ala Carte was not indemnifying Prime Group for Prime’s own negligence (something caused by Prime).

A worker was injured fixing HVAC units on the roof of the building. Fixing the HVAC saw Ala Carte’s responsibility, maintaining the rest of the roof was Prime’s. After the worker sued Prime, Prime sued Ala Carte and tendered the defense of the claim to Clarendon, with whom Ala Carte had the policy that was required under the INSURANCE clause. Clarendon filed a declaratory action to have a court find that it had no duty to indemnify Prime and later agreed to defend Prime under a reservation. Prime then sued Ala Carte for breaching its contract because there was a clause in the Clarendon policy to Ala Carte that read:

Policy Change No. 8 Endorsement

If liability for injury or damage is imposed or sought to be imposed on the additional insured because of: (a) Its own acts or omissions, this insurance does not apply.

The circuit court found in favor of Ala Carte and Prime appealed. On appeal, the appellate court found that the anti-indemnity provisions of the contract (those stating that Ala Carte was not to indemnify Prime for Prime’s negligence) did not contradict the insurance provisions because Illinois law has found that you can contract to get insurance for your negligence acts even if you could not be indemnified by a party for them.

Importantly, the court also held that the Endorsement’s negation of coverage for Prime was a breach of the contract provision between Prime and Ala Carte and remanded the case for a hearing on the damages resulting from that breach.

Make sure you read the contract language and either insert or remove this language depending upon your needs… and always read the policy once you get it to make sure it is in compliance with such a provision. A little double-checking in the beginning could have saved everyone this headache later on.

New Suit Fridays - 4-24-09

It’s Friday, so you know what that means, we bring you a collection of the complaints in some of the latest suits filed regarding matters touching on the industry:

  • Sure to be of interest to Chicago White Sox fans, Pacific Construction has brought a  breach of contract claim against Maverick Pools. The complaint alleges that Maverick breached the contract by “refusing to unload and install” two pre-manufactured pools and to construct a thermal pool. The damages sought are in excess of $107,496.00.
  • The complaints and allegations regarding the current mortgage crisis and the industry are likely just beginning. In this suit, a class action suit for federal securities violations is brought against Corus Bank and several others. The allegations are that Corus failed to tell investors that it was buying condominiums at prices that were inflated in developments financed by Corus and that the purchases caused inflated appraisals which led to inflated values on Corus’ books… So the bank allegedly didn’t actualize the proper losses on the loans it had made for the condominiums.
  • In one of the weirder suits we’ve seen over the past year, some owners allege that a building was built on their land without their knowledge. Gavric v. Brosna Construction alleges that the defendants owning a parcel adjacent to the plaintiffs’ constructed “a three story, sub-standard, apartment building” on their property illegally. The complaint alleges trespass, conversion, negligence, seeks termination of a lien placed on their land by the contractor who built the project, a count for slander of title, and seeks remedy under Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.)
  • In a home defect case, Rangel v. Jumic, et al, alleges that defendants failed to disclose material defects that they were aware of prior to the sale of a home to plaintiffs. The defects complained of include problems with the heat distribution system, water infiltrating through the masonry, cracks in portions of the home and problems with the hardwood floors. The suit contains counts for breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability and fitness for a particular purpose and violations of the Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act. (765 ILCS 77/1 et seq.)
  • Finally, a condominium association has brought a suit against the developer of its property at 1255 South State Street as well as the owner of the garage in which residents of the condominium park. The complaint alleges that the developers deal with the owner of the garage and the effect of forcing a fee for parking in the garage that a recorded Declaration had on the plaintiffs was not disclosed to the plaintiffs. Prior to November of 2007, the residents had access to the garage and their parking spaces by use of “a remote clicker” provided by the garage owner and that in November of 2007, the garage owner installed a parking “toll system” that restricted the residents ability to come and go from their parking spaces.  There are several problems with the transponders alleged in the complaint among them, that the new parking system is not a benefit to the users of the property, that the residents were not properly informed of its installation, and that the owner has improperly requested that the residents pay for a portion of the new system. The residents seek a declaratory judgment regarding the new parking system and their rights granted by easement, and allege breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and consumer fraud.

When does a design professional owe a legal duty to the employee of a subcontractor on a construction site?

In Dorris v. Baxter & Woodman, the plaintiff, Leon Dorris, filed a lawsuit seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when he fell from a metal-grated walkway (air  bridge) that collapsed while he was working on the renovation of a wastewater treatment  plant owned by the City of Woodstock. In his lawsuit, Plaintiff named Baxter & Woodman, Inc. (“Baxter & Woodman”), Joseph J. Henderson & Son, Inc. (“Henderson”)  and Enviroquip, Inc. (“Enviroquip”) as defendants claiming the negligence of each entity proximately caused his injuries. Baxter & Woodman, an engineering firm, was retained by the City of Woodstock to provide engineering services and serve as the City’s representative on the construction project. Henderson was the general contractor for the project and Enviroquip was the manufacturer of the air bridge[1]. Plaintiff worked for Fischer Mechanical Group (“Fischer”),  the plumbing subcontractor on the project. 

As part of the construction project, Henderson erected/constructed a metal-grated platform as part of an air bridge that was to provide access to the center of a digester (large concrete tank used to treat wastewater). Two weeks after Henderson had installed the metal- grated platform, Plaintiff was walking on the platform when a portion of the metal grating collapsed causing him to fall into the digester. At the time of the accident, the metal grating was not secured with banding at the edges or with attachment clips at the ends as specified in the manufacturer’s installation instructions. The specification for the metal grating, included in the construction documents, required that the edges of the grating be secured with banding bars and that the metal grating be installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s installation instructions and approved shop drawings. The manufacturer’s instructions, which stated that the  grating should be banded at the edges and secured with at least four attachment clips at each end, were contained in a shop drawing approved by Baxter & Woodman and included as a  specification in the construction documents. 

The duties and responsibilities of Baxter & Woodman were defined in the contract documents. Specifically, Baxter & Woodman contractually agreed to act as the City’s on-site  project representative during the construction. Baxter & Woodman agreed to enforce the plans, drawings, and specifications and to “provide full and complete construction supervision  services.” The construction supervision services included “daily inspection” to ensure that all work was performed “in conformity with the Contract Documents.” Baxter & Woodman was further required to review and approve shop drawings, manufacturer’s literature and other submittals for compliance with the drawings and specifications. Significantly, this review and approval included the means and methods of construction that were “specifically and expressly called for by the Contract Documents.” Further, Baxter & Woodman had the authority to reject work that did not conform to the contract documents. 

Baxter & Woodman’s contract obligated it to provide a resident project representative to  observe the work in progress and assist the engineer in determining if the work is “proceeding in  accordance with the Contract Documents.” The resident project representative was required to report any work that “does not conform to the Contract Documents.” Per it contract, Baxter & Woodman had the authority to direct or assume control over “any aspect of the means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures of construction [where] such advice or directions are specifically required by the Contract Documents.” 

Prior to trial, Baxter & Woodman was granted summary judgment as the court determined that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff.  This decision was based on the court’s belief  that any duty Baxter & Woodman had to inspect the air bridge for compliance with the plans and specifications had not arisen as of the time of Plaintiff’s accident since the construction of the air bridge was not complete when Plaintiff fell. However, the trial court later reversed itself based on the fact that Baxter & Woodman’s contract did not require it to inspect the construction for compliance with the plans and specifications only after the work was complete. There was also deposition testimony indicating that Baxter & Woodman’s resident project representative had the authority to inspect the work whenever he chose. Further, it was Baxter & Woodman’s job to make sure that the work was performed in accordance with the plans and specifications and the construction documents expressly provided that the metal grating for the air bridge be banded and clipped before the platform was assembled over the digester. As such, the trial court reinstated the case against Baxter & Woodman. 

At trial, Baxter & Woodman’s resident project representative, Kevin Hinderliter, testified that he inspected ongoing work for defective materials and to enforce the contract specifications throughout the course of the project. Mr. Hinderliter acknowledged that he had at times discovered work that did not meet the specifications, and in those instances, he directly advised the contractor of the variance so the defect could be corrected. Mr. Hinderliter testified that, at time, he specifically insisted that certain work be redone in a manner that complied with the specifications. Additionally, Mr. Hinderliter discussed safety issues at Baxter & Woodman’s progress meetings and dealt with safety concerns. Furthermore, Mr. Hinderliter testified that on the day of Plaintiff’s accident, he knew that the grating did not have the banding along the edges or the attachment clips at the ends as required by the specifications.

At the close of the evidence, the jury found that Baxter & Woodman was 70% liable for Plaintiff’s injuries and returned a verdict of $11 million in favor of Plaintiff. Judgment of $3,675,000 was entered against Baxter & Woodman after the set off from the Henderson/Enviroquip settlement.

Baxter & Woodman appealed claiming, in part, that it owed no duty to Plaintiff.

The First District Appellate Court held that Baxter & Woodman had a duty to exercise its supervisory authority to ensure that the air bridge’s metal grating was secured by banding bars and attachment clips. Dorris v. Baxter & Woodman, No. 1-07-3126, p. 13 (December 2, 2008). In its reasoning, the Court cited various portions of Baxter & Woodman’s contract which obligated it to enforce the specifications, including the means and methods of the work that were expressly provided for by the contract documents, and provided authority to reject work that did not conform to the plans. Id. As such, the Court stated that Baxter & Woodman clearly and specifically agreed to this duty by the terms of its contract. Id. Further, the Court concluded that the contract documents required Baxter & Woodman to inspect the work for compliance with the specifications on an ongoing basis and to reject work that did not comply with the construction document. Id. at 14. Accordingly, the Court cited Putman v. Village of Bensenville, 337 Ill. App. 3d 197, 208, 786 N.E.2d 203 (2nd Dist. 2003) in stating that a claim of negligence may be based upon the failure to perform an act required by contract. In such circumstances where the duty of care arises out of a contract, the scope of such duty is defined by the terms of the contract. Putman, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 208-09; see also Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort, 105 Ill.2d 474, 482, 475 N.E.2d 822 (1985). 

In Illinois, a design professional has a duty to protect a subcontractor’s employee from injury on a construction site where the design professional undertakes significant supervisory responsibilities or agrees to ensure that the work is performed in accordance with the contract documents. Dorris v. Baxter & Woodman, No. 1-07-3126, pp. 12-13 (December 2, 2008); see also Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill.2d 273, 284-85, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). 

This duty will not be charge of a design professional where the contract provides that the design professional (1) has no supervisory responsibility, (2) has no control of or responsibility for the means, methods, techniques, procedures or sequences of construction, (3) has no responsibility for the failure of any contractor to perform the work in accordance with the contract documents, and (4) has no responsibility to devise, implement or enforce any safety precautions or programs for the project. Dorris v. Baxter & Woodman, No. 1-07-3126, pp. 12-13 (December 2, 2008); see also Putman, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 208-09; Ferentchak, 105 Ill.2d at 480-81, 475 N.E.2d 822 (1985).

Some pointers:

  • In order to avoid claims and the liabilities as incurred by Baxter & Woodman, it is very important for design professionals to take certain precautions in drafting their contract. A design professional’s contract should explicitly detail the scope of services it is providing. The contract should unambiguously state that the design professional (1) has no supervisory responsibility, (2) has no control of or responsibility for the means, methods, techniques, procedures or sequences of construction, (3) has no responsibility for the failure of any contractor to perform the work in accordance with the contract documents, and (4) has no responsibility to devise, implement or enforce any safety precautions or programs for the project. As part of a design professional’s construction administration services, the designer often reviews the general progress of the work and may certify that work was performed in accordance with the contract documents. However, if this service is to be included in the design professional’s scope of services, the contract should explicitly state that the designer is not required to make an exhaustive or continuous inspections of the work and that the designer is not required to ensure proper construction methods or safety precautions or to see that construction documents are followed. Rather, the design professional may provide opinions or recommendations to the owner, which the owner need not necessarily follow. 
  • Additionally, it is equally important for design professionals to strictly adhere to their contract and not assume any additional duties by their conduct. The design professional should also avoid maintaining a continuous on-site presence so as to avoid any inference that it is supervising the construction or in control of the premises. Further, the design professional should avoid holding or attending jobsite safety meetings or inspections so as to avoid any inference of control or supervision over safety. If the design professional becomes aware of a variance from the construction documents or any potential safety hazard, the designer should report the issue to the owner and qualify its report as an opinion or suggestion for consideration by the owner. The designer should not directly stop any contractor’s work or issue any directive based on the construction work. Again, reporting opinions for consideration to the owner with a qualifier (i.e. this report is only the opinion of the designer and does not constitute a directive of action or in any way modify the designer’s responsibilities or duties under its contract) is the most prudent course of action. 

Following these recommendations does not guarantee that the design professional will not be sued or even found liable; however, these tips are provided to help reduce the risk of exposure associated with design professionals’ services.



[1] Henderson and Enviroquip (along with Plaintiff’s employer) settled with Plaintiff shortly before trial for $7,325,000, leaving Baxter & Woodman as the only remaining defendant.

 

News & Notes - 3/27/09

 

A good document retention policy is a must and tailoring it to anyone involved in Illinois’ construction industry is an important part of its creation. With the advent of electronic discovery we all need to be aware of just how much we’re deleting when we erase files. In a fun article over at Law.com, Craig Ball has challenged the Gutmann method (that you need to overwrite your hard drive 35 times to completely erase data). The reality will be fascinating to those of you interested in making sure erased files stay erased.

In a suit filed in Cook County, the developer of the Palmolive Building (seen below) has sued its architecture firm for money that it may be forced to pay in arbitration with Pepper Construction in an arbitration action brought by Pepper against the developer. A copy of the complaint is here.

For those of you wondering why those forum selection clauses are so important, given that Illinois law mandates that construction contracts for project in Illinois be litigated in Illinois under Illinois law… Here’s a complaint filed by FC Stone against former clients who brought a suit in California despite a forum selection clause in their contracts. The suit is for the monies FC Stone had to expend to enforce the forum selection clause in the California court. Paying attention to both the Illinois law and the forum selection clause in contracts can help avoid such a challenge.

The Hartford is suing Grace Electrical Construction for close to $1.8 million that it had to pay out on bonds because Grace allegedly failed to perform. Under the Illinois Public Construction Bond Act (30 ILCS 550) Grace was required to obtain the bonds, but Hartford alleges that it has received more than $2.5 million in claims on the bonds that Grace was responsible for and has paid out the $1.8 million to settle those claims. The complaint can be found here.

 

Protect Your Copyright - Freedenfeld v. McTigue

 

It’s a good feeling when we’re able to show you just how important following through on protecting your rights can be… not to mention the smug satisfaction of being able to say we told you so

Warren Freedenfeld Associates, Inc. v. McTigue D.V.M., which the South Carolina Construction Law Blog has posted on, is a case that should have design professionals thinking twice about doing anything with the ownership of their creations other than granting a limited license to an owner.

The architect was retained by a client and drafted plans for a veterinary clinic. The parties executed and AIA standard form agreement, likely the B151-1997 because the opinion references an Article 6 that deems the architect the author of the plans and drawings and this all took place in 1998.

The relationship went south over disputes about payment and budgeting. The architect sent the vet a letter warning that all the plans they had produced were proprietary and that no one could use them to complete the project and demanded return of the plans. The vet responded that the plans were useless and that they had been “rolled up and discarded.”

Shortly thereafter, the architect took the step securing a copyright over the plans by filing an application with the United States Copyright Office.

In September of 1999 the parties formally terminated their disputes over payment with a written Termination Agreement and the agreement stipulated that Article 6 remained in full force and effect. The agreement also said that neither the vet nor his proposed hospital would use any of the work solely produced by the architect.

The vet hired a different architect to complete the hospital and in June of 2000, the veterinary hospital opened for business.

In 2004, the architect came across an article in Veterinary Economics featuring a drawing of the floor plan of the veterinary hospital at issue… and that the design had won a merit award. The architect went to city hall and got a copy of the building plans and concluded that his copyright had been violated.

In September of 2005, the architect filed suit in federal court against the hospital, the vet and several other parties alleging copyright infringement and other violations.

The defendants moved to dismiss based on the three-year statute of limitations contained in the copyright act. The district court granted the motion to dismiss ruling that any reasonably diligent person would have learned of the copyright infringement when the hospital opened, so the copyright claim’s three-year statute of limitations ran from that date in June of 2000. The architect appealed.

The appellate court analyzed the lower court’s determination about when a reasonable person would have been aware of the infringement and found that the availability of the plans on file and the fact that the hospital was open for a time did not amount to notice that would start the limitations clock:

“Architects have no general, free-standing duty to comb through public records or to visit project sites in order to police their copyrights.”

The court held that the record in front of them did not compel a finding that the architect had not been vigilant or that the architect had been on notice since 2000 and reversed the dismissal of the copyright claim.

The architect now has the ability to prosecute his copyright claim and if he prevails, he may ask for his attorney's fees as well. For the small cost of filing the copyright he gained this added protection… not to mention, since he retained the rights to the plans, he had the ability to request them when something went south on the project… in Illinois, if one adds these remedies to the contractor prompt payment act and the mechanics lien act - a design professional’s ability to obtain payment is drastically strengthened.

 

Skarin Custom Homes v. Ross - A Lesson in Full Disclosure

 

When the parties to a real estate contract know that the buyer intends to raze the only structure located thereon and redevelop the property, is the Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act applicable to the transaction?

Yes, according to Skarin Custom Homes, Inc. v. Ross (Doc. No. 02-08-0061, 2nd Dist.).

In Skarin, the parties entered into a residential real estate contract and the sellers checked the box on the disclosure form showing they were aware of flooding or recurring leakage problems in the basement of the property. They explained the leakage as “some seepage in the basement during heavy rains.”

The parties closed on the contract. Sure enough, the buyers soon found out that there was a history of severe flooding in the basement. Arguably, it could have been worse:

 

The buyers sued for breach of contract and breach of the Disclosure Act. The trial court dismissed the claims based on the buyers admission during the case that their original intent in purchasing the property was to tear down the house, build a new house, and sell the property for profit. This is likely what they had in mind.

The trial court found that the intent of the buyers to raze the property removed the transaction from the Disclosure Act. The buyers appeal and the appellate court disagreed.

The appellate court found that the act applied because the house was being used as a residence at the time of the sale, was fully functional, and none of the nine exceptions listed in the act were met.

These nine exceptions are:

Sec. 15. The provisions of this Act do not apply to the following:
    (1) Transfers pursuant to court order, including, but not limited to, transfers ordered by a probate court in administration of an estate, transfers between spouses resulting from a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation, transfers pursuant to an order of possession, transfers by a trustee in bankruptcy, transfers by eminent domain, and transfers resulting from a decree for specific performance.
    (2) Transfers from a mortgagor to a mortgagee by deed in lieu of foreclosure or consent judgment, transfer by judicial deed issued pursuant to a foreclosure sale to the successful bidder or the assignee of a certificate of sale, transfer by a collateral assignment of a beneficial interest of a land trust, or a transfer by a mortgagee or a successor in interest to the mortgagee's secured position or a beneficiary under a deed in trust who has acquired the real property by deed in lieu of foreclosure, consent judgment or judicial deed issued pursuant to a foreclosure sale.
    (3) Transfers by a fiduciary in the course of the administration of a decedent's estate, guardianship, conservatorship, or trust.
    (4) Transfers from one co‑owner to one or more other co‑owners.
    (5) Transfers pursuant to testate or intestate succession.
    (6) Transfers made to a spouse, or to a person or persons in the lineal line of consanguinity of one or more of the sellers.
    (7) Transfers from an entity that has taken title to residential real property from a seller for the purpose of assisting in the relocation of the seller, so long as the entity makes available to all prospective buyers a copy of the disclosure form furnished to the entity by the seller.
    (8) Transfers to or from any governmental entity.
    (9) Transfers of newly constructed residential real property that has not been occupied. (765 ILCS 77/15)

The court made specific note of the fact that “a buyer’s intent to tear down a residential structure and rebuild on the property is not listed as an exception.”

We wonder why they would bother filling out the form in the first place if they didn’t think the act applied. The better question is why they would down-play the amount of the flooding if they figured the house would be torn down. We realize this is a punt… but the lesson here is “don’t lie” and don’t assume that someone’s representations are true… get it in the contract.

 

Quincy Mall, Inc. v. Kerasotes Showplace Theatres, LLC (4th Dist., Doc. No. 4-08-0409) - Another Leaky Roof Case

 

There’s a fun idea that I’ve always attributed to Bob Balaban that I first encountered it in an interview he gave on Fresh Air back in 2002.   Unlike some of his other interviews discussing his family’s history in the movie business, he was a little more descriptive about his silver screen pioneering ancestors.

In talking about his grandmother’s decision to want to get into the movie business he said that she left the theatre one day after seeing a movie for the first time and decided it was the business for the family because it was the only time she remembered anyone paying full price for something before they knew what they were going to get.

Don’t worry, this isn’t an article about putting an attorney on retainer. 

It’s about a recent case from the fourth district that has enforced a standard for properly allowing commercial tenants to set off rental payments in an amount equal to what they’ve paid in repairs for something the Landlord was liable to replace under the lease.

The case involved a damaged roof at a movie theatre in Quincy, Illinois. The theatre rents space from the mall.

In 2003 the theatre had the roof inspected because it had been leaking. Shortly after the inspection, the theatre sent the mall a letter requesting that the mall replace the roof. The mall did not respond and the theatre had its attorney send another letter that said:

"As it is the [Mall's] responsibility to replace the roof, [Theatre], by this letter, is making demand upon the [Mall] for reimbursement of the replacement cost. [Theatre] is willing to advance the cost of the replacement to be set off against future rents. If [the Mall] prefer[s], [it] may reimburse [Theatre] directly. The replacement will occur as soon as weather permits. Upon completion of and payment for the replacement,[Theatre] will initiate the setoff unless you wish to reimburse [Theatre]in a lump sum or pay the contractor directly."

The mall responded saying that the lease included the following provision which the mall interpreted to mean that the theatre was responsible for replacing the roof:

"Tenant agrees during the term hereof to keep and maintain in good condition and repair, the demised premises and every part thereof, including without limitation the foundations, exterior walls, roof, exterior and interior portions of all doors, windows, plate glass, etc."

The theatre replied that since the correspondence from the mall did not mention the need to replace the roof, nor the estimated cost to fix the roof, the theatre would go ahead with the replacement and that the theatre was not waiving any of its rights to reimbursement or damages relative to the mall’s duty to repair the roof.

The mall didn’t respond to the letter and the theatre had the roof fixed and sent the mall notice that the repairs were contracted for and that they would be setting off the entire cost of the roof repair from the rent obligation. The cost to repair the roof was $79,298 and the work was finished in March. 

Between June and December, the theatre set off $79,298 from the rent it owed the mall. In December, the mall sued the theatre to recover the rent. The theatre denied that it owed the mall rent and requested that the court make a determination that the theatre had satisfied its contractual obligations when it replaced the mall’s roof.

The trial court agreed with the theatre and entered a judgment stating that they had satisfied their rent obligations through payment for the roof and were entitled to set off the rent.

The appellate court agreed. It distinguished the clause for “repair” of the roof in the theatre’s contract with the mall from one in which “replacement” would be required. The court also held that the set off was proper.

In holding that set off was proper the court looked to the history of the law governing lease agreements and reasoned, in a similar fashion to the article from John Orth in the latest issue of the Green Bag, that the historic trend in real estate law that has transformed the lessor’s interest in land from a property right to a right under contract. This transformation, the court opined, has not changed the former covenants between the landlord and lessor, which allow for the lessor to set off rent in the amount equal to repairs the lessor made that the landlord should have made.

The court concluded:

“Thus, when a commercial landlord fails to replace a critical component of the leased premises, which is vital to the operation of its commercial tenant's business—in violation of the landlord's duty to do so, as previously discussed—the commercial tenant may set off such replacement cost, provided that (1) the tenant has informed the landlord of the need to replace the necessary component; (2) the landlord failed to replace the necessary component in a timely manner; and (3) the tenant informed the landlord of its intent to set off the reasonable costs of the necessary replacement.”

It’s a valuable lesson in drafting the lease agreement with particularity if there’s something that should be included in the agreement, and for a procedure to make sure set off is proper.

The opinion can be found here.

 

Kunkel v. P.K. Dependable Construction, LLC (5th Dist., Doc. No. 5-07-0684)

 

Here’s another for your files on the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.) and its application in matters relative to the Construction Industry in Illinois.

The Kunkels hired PK to build a new roof for their home. The contract price plus extras came to $5,623. After the contract was entered into, PK never furnished the Kunkels with the required: “Home repair: Know Your Consumer Rights” pamphlet that the Illinois Attorney General’s Office publishes for contractors to give to home-owners pursuant to the Illinois Home Repair and Remodeling Act (815 ILCS 513/1 et seq.).

To their surprise, the Kunkel’s new roof leaked. They requested that PK fix the problem several times. PK came out and attempted repairs, but the repairs did not alleviate the leaking. The Kunkels documented the leaks and their conversations with PK. They even took pictures of the pots and pans they used to catch the water.

Finally, the Kunkels filed suit in court alleging breach of contract, warranty and breach of the consumer fraud act. The case went to trial and the Kunkels prevailed. The trial court found that PK breached the contract and warranty (the contract contained a provision for a five-year warranty) and awarded $6,725 to the Kunkels based on their estimator’s uncontradicted testimony that $6,725 would be cost of a new roof.

The circuit court also awarded $6,161.50 in attorneys’ fees based on the allegation that the failure to provide the pamphlet amounted to a violation of the consumer fraud act.

PK appealed and the appellate court upheld the award for $6,725. The appellate court struck down the attorneys fees – finding that the consumer fraud act required a “knowing” violation and that the Kunkels never introduced evidence that PK “knew” it was required to turn over a copy of the pamphlet. The court went on to address the issue of damages… stating that even if the failure to turn over the pamphlet did amount to a violation of the consumer fraud act, the violation Kunkels failed to produce any evidence that they were damaged in not receiving the pamphlet.

This reasoning is a far cry from many of the other cases we see where parties are presumed to know the law at the time of contracting. One could even go so far as to say that so long as a contractor hasn’t read the Home Repair and Remodeling Act, they could always use their ignorance and this case as an excuse to avoid liability any time liability is attached to a “knowing” violation of the statute… which is a little ridiculous. The damages issue is correct. The failure to turn over the pamphlet shouldn’t entitle anyone to a windfall. We weren’t talking about a windfall here though, we were talking about the $6,161.50 in attorneys’ fees the Kunkels had to expend on a full trial just to get the money back for their leaky roof.

Additionally, the lessons learned by those involved in litigation over small projects is a powerful one. Payments of $5,623 for the original roof, and $6,151.50 to the attorneys netted the home-owners $6,725… which they still have to collect and then apply to getting a new roof that doesn’t leak, leaving an unpaid balance … of $5,059.50. That’s hardly worth it.

The opinion can be found here.

 

The AIA Claim Accrual Provision Trumps the Discovery Rule - Federal Insurance Co. v. Konstant Architecture Planning, Inc. (1st Dist., Doc. No 1-08-0938)

It’s another great day for the AIA. In this case, Federal Insurance brought a claim against Konstant after Federal paid out over $300,000 to its insureds - a couple who had mold damage in their house.

Konstant had a contract with the home owners to design a home in Winnetka, Illinois. The contract (likely the B141-1987 since the work was completed in 1997, and since the B151-1997’s addition of “In no event shall such statutes of limitations commence to run any later than the date when the Architect's services are substantially completed” is not included in the provision contained in the Court’s opinion – but reference to §9.3 of a standard form AIA agreement is) had the following provision:

“Causes of action between the parties to this Agreement pertaining to acts or failures to act shall be deemed to have accrued and the applicable statutes of limitations shall commence to run not later than either the date of Substantial Completion, or the date of issuance of the final Certificate for Payment for acts or failures to act occurring after Substantial Completion.” 

The home owners found water and mold damage in their home in November of 2002, well after the 1997 date of substantial completion. Federal paid under the home owners policy and was subrogated to their rights and in turn, brought an action against Konstant for breach of contract in September of 2005.

Konstant’s attorneys moved to dismiss the action claiming it was time-barred under the Illinois four-year statutory limitations period governing the construction of improvements to real property (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a)) which states:

“(a) Actions based upon tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing an action, or his or her privity, knew or should reasonably have known of such act or omission. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, contract actions against a surety on a payment or performance bond shall be commenced, if at all, within the same time limitation applicable to the bond principal.”

In the circuit court, the designer’s lawyers argued that the contract provision at issue meant that the four-year statute of limitations period began to run in 1997 thanks to the AIA contract provision. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. The owners appealed and argued that a different section of the statute of limitations provisions (735 ILCS 5/13-206) – a 10 year limitations period – applied to the instant case. The appellate court agreed with the trial court and made two important findings, one obvious and one not:

1.       The construction statute (13-214(a)) applies when a defendant is being sued for its act or omission of one of the statute’s enumerated construction-related activities. i.e. - the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property. (obvious)

2.       the extended 10-year statute of limitations which runs from the “discovery” of an act or omission under 13-214(b) is superseded by a parties contractual provision – like that of §9.3 – and will be viewed as an agreement between the parties to shorten the statute of limitations period so long as the agreed time-period is not in violation of public policy. (not obvious)

The lesson here is to make sure that as an engineer, architect, contractor or anyone in a contract with the owner, that you get that provision in your contract. There’s no reason to be carrying a ten-year risk when you can shorten it to, at least, 4 years… as an owner, you will want to make this provision a negotiating point that can impact the cost of your project given that you are now giving up something substantial when you agree to such a provision.

The full opinion can be found here.

University of Chicago Hospitals Sues Bankrupt HLM Design, Inc.

It’s not always true that there’s no point to beating a dead horse… The horse might have insurance.

In this recent action (link goes to the complaint) filed by the University of Chicago Medical Center against HLM Design, Inc. (N.D. IL, Case No. 2009 cv 730)  The University is suing HLM for breaching its contract for the design of the UofC’s Comer Children’s Hospital. The allegations are that HLM’s designs “failed to include important elements, failed to incorporate value engineering opportunities that would have saved UCMC money, and were inconsistent with applicable codes and regulations.”

The problem is that HLM filed for Bankruptcy in 2004.  HLM was purchased by Heery International at auction. The University had to go to the bankruptcy court in North Carolina where HLM filed in order to get permission to sue HLM in the hopes that HLM’s insurance carrier would have the money to satisfy the damages (in excess of 2 Million according to the complaint) allegedly caused by HLM’s breach of contract.

Oddly, the way the complaint reads, you can tell that the problems HLM was having in fulfilling their end of the deal were the result of the impending bankruptcy, and yet the University alleges that it didn’t learn of the bankruptcy until “well after the filing.”

We will continue to keep you posted as this case develops. It’s going to be interesting to see the if the University can get from the insurance carrier what it cannot obtain from HLM.

Your License is the Ticket, but Don't Forget to Register

Here’s an opinion from the Northern District, Blythe Holdings, Inc. v. Flawless Financial Corp., et al. (Doc. No. 06-C-5262, 2009), that should serve as a reminder to keep your registration as a professional design firm current.

The plaintiff’s sued numerous individuals and corporations over a complex real estate transaction in connection with redeveloping multiple vacant lots in the City of Chicago’s 16th Ward. As part of the transaction, plaintiffs entered into an agreement with a defendant architecture firm. The agreement, which contained an arbitration provision, was signed by a principal of the firm who was a licensed architect. A $25,000 retainer was paid to the principal.

Soon enough, the deal went south and the plaintiff was involved in litigation when it believed that many of the lots involved in the transaction were completely unsuitable for development and that no work had been performed to secure the lots they had been promised.

In addition to suing the developers and the attorneys representing them, the plaintiffs sued the architect on the project to get their money back. The architect defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, or to stay the proceedings pending the arbitration they were entitled to under their contract. The plaintiffs responded that the contract was void and could not be enforced, because at the time they entered into the agreement, the architecture firm was no a registered professional design firm with the state of Illinois. (We’ve written about this before.) Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that because the contract didn’t use the full name of the architecture firm, the contract should be declared void.

Neither of these arguments is very good. The second is laughable. While it is true that the Illinois Supreme court has yet to specifically address this issue, many courts have already reasoned that because the work is performed by a licensed architect, it is the licensure – which is proof that standards are met through the design professional’s credentialing process -  that keeps the public safe, which is the point of the process. The fact that an entity may register as a professional design firm has nothing to do with public safety; public safety is the policy behind the act that requires registration.  The court upheld the contracts and their arbitration provisions and allowed the action against the design professionals to proceed in arbitration against the desires of the plaintiffs.

Note, however, that there are criminal penalties for the failure to register your design firm. While the arguments may not be persuasive to a court in determining whether or not to uphold a contract… people doing business with you may report you to the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation for the failure to register your firm.

Don't Forget to Apportion a Lien Filed Against a Condo Association

Pepper Construction Company is being sued for its work constructing the high-rise condo building over at 720-726 Randolph in Chicago.  The complaint alleges multiple counts including:

  • Delays on the project
  • Faulty workmanship
  • Slandering the title to the land
  • Breach of warranty
  • Breach of their contract with the owner
  • And fraudulent concealment of defective work

This may be the first in a series of suits over this property, the City View Tower. 

Starting on page 23 of the complaint, you’ll see an interesting claim regarding the mechanic’s lien and its something worth noting if you’re either involved in the construction of condominium projects (high-rise or not) or if you’re developing them.  There are multiple cases presently before the courts regarding this issue.  The Condominium Property Act requires that mechanic’s liens be apportioned – Section 9.1.  So, in addition to making sure the strict timing requirements of the Mechanic’s Lien Act are followed, anyone seeking to file their lien against a condominium property (any property where the condominium declaration has been recorded) should familiarize themselves with Section 9.1 before filing.

 

Protect Yourself And Make Sure You're Getting The Insurance You Contract For

Any discussion of your project is going to involve insurance.  Whether you’re naming someone as an additional insured or being named as one is a part of every construction project.  Making sure that you get what you want is not as easy as you might think.  And the recent case of United Stationers Supply Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. et al, (Illinois, Doc. No. 1-07-2779) is proof that you need to pay attention to what you’ve contracted for and what you’ve received as proof that those obligations have been fulfilled.

In this case, the plaintiff sought a declaration from the court that the insurance company for its general contractor was required to defend and indemnify it after an employee of the company was injured while working on a construction project to replace a roof at the plaintiff’s plant.  The injured worker alleged he was supervised and managed by the general contractor and injured while using the general contractor’s equipment.  The employee had sued the general contractor and the general in turn had sued the plant owner (the plaintiff in this action) for contribution.  The plaintiff requested that the insurance company that supplied a commercial general liability policy to the general contractor defend and indemnify the plaintiff in the underlying injury action and the insurance company denied that it had any obligation to do so.  The parties filed an action seeking a declaration that their version of the obligations of the insurance company was the correct one and the lower court found that the insurance company had no duty to defend or indemnify the plaintiff.

The reasons for that lack of duty are important to anyone entering a contract related to a construction project.  The general contractor and the plaintiff had entered into a contract which had terms that required the general contractor to obtain specific types of insurance, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation, Contractual Liability Insurance, Automobile Liability Insurance, and Hazardous Materials Insurance.  Nowhere in the contract was the general contractor required to obtain Commercial General Liability insurance.  In fact, the contract only required that the general obtain Contractual Liability Insurance with the requirement that it be endorsed to cover the indemnity agreement (a standard indemnity agreement) between the parties which required the general to indemnify the plaintiff.  The contract also required that the general contractor furnish a certificate of insurance that named the plaintiff as an additional insured and did not require or specify which type of insurance the plaintiff was to be named as an additional insured.

The manner in which the First District made its findings is attributable to the vague nature of the contract.  As is usually the case, that ambiguity provides a learning point.

 

With regard to the fact that the plaintiff was named on the certificate of insurance for the CGL policy, but not on the actual endorsement to the policy or required by contract to be named as an additional insured for the policy, the court pointed out something you will likely see on all your certificates.  Take a look at this sample certificate, particularly the language in the upper right hand corner:

This certificate is issued as a matter of information only and confers no rights upon the certificate holder.  This certificate does not amend, extend or alter the coverage afforded by the policies below.

The court looked to that language and applied it to the coverage in this matter finding that the certificate did not alter the coverage and that the specific language put the plaintiff on notice that coverage is governed by the terms of the insurance policy and not the certificate.  Remember, the certificate isn’t the policy and the endorsement needs to be clear.

Second, the court found that none of the contractual language implied that the plaintiff would be added as an additional insured to the CGL policy. 

With this reasoning in mind the court found:

Based on the foregoing, we find as a matter of law that United Stationers is not an additional insured under the CGL policy because: (1) United Stationers is not specifically listed as an additional insured in the policy; (2) the construction contract requiring D.C. Taylor to purchase insurance on behalf of United Stationers did not specifically require the purchase of a commercial general liability policy; (3) there is no evidence of intent by the parties that United Stationers was to be added as an additional insured; and (4) the disclaimer language in the certificate of insurance put United Stationers on notice that the CGL policy language governed coverage of additional insureds.

 

Because the contract was not clear, and the certificate disclaimed any change to liability, the plaintiff was not covered under the policy.

As a side note, this is a small difference between the new ConsensusDocs and the AIA 201 – 2007 general conditions.  The ConsensusDocs 200 uses specific names for the types of policies required by the contract, i.e. CGL, Employer’s Liability, Business Automobile Liability, and does not require that the parties name anyone as an additional insured, but offers the option of selecting additional insured coverage in Section 10.5.  The AIA 201 identifies the types of claims against which the contractor should have coverage (Section 11.1.1) and requires that the owner be named in the commercial liability coverage as a default (Section 11.1.4).  Both contracts require that certificates be furnished to the owner, but under the present case, a certificate may not be enough.

The lessons are simple for a company looking to ensure legally binding coverage on their construction project in Illinois, there are two lessons from this case:

1)       Contracts should mandate that every type of insurance required is named in the contract, including terms like “commercial general liability” or others describing the coverage needed with specificity.

2)      Request that you be named on the endorsement and get a copy of the endorsement or make sure it has language sufficiently broad enough to include you as someone who has required the insured to name them as an additional insured – not just requesting a certificate of insurance.

 

 

 

 

Your BIM Contracting Options Just Got Bigger

As we wrote about before, the new AIA BIM and IPD documents have now been released and are available for download.  The new documents are:

  • E202-2008 - A New Building Information Modeling (BIM) Protocol Exhibit
  • C196 and C197 – 2008 - Two New Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) Agreements
  • A441 and C441 – 2008 - Two Additional Design-Build (DB) Agreements
  • B207 – 2008 - An On-Site Project Representation.

The documents are available at the AIA website.  They will be of interest to anyone participating in BIM projects and looking for a comparison or alternative to the ConsensusDocs BIM forms.

Indemnification Doesn't Necessarily Mean Attorney's Fees

Michael Downs v. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, (Ill. App. 1st, Doc. No. 1-08-0636) will be of interest to anyone reviewing their own contracts.  The case involves a contract's indemnity provision and whether or not it included an indemnification for attorney’s fees.

In a prior action, the plaintiff, a CEO and Member of a limited liability company, had been sued for breach of his fiduciary duties and breach of contract.  He successfully defended those claims and then filed a separate action against the corporation for breaching their agreement to indemnify him by not paying him for the attorney’s fees he expended in the prior case.

The agreement’s indemnification provision read:

“21.2  The Company shall indemnify each Member for any act performed by such Member with respect to Company matters permitted by this Agreement and/or Majority Approval, but in no event for fraud, willful misconduct, negligence or an intentional breach of this Agreement.”

The plaintiff argued that because only the word indemnify was used, it should be interpreted to have a broad meaning that included attorney’s fees.  The court analogized this case to a case where the word “defend” had been used in the indemnification agreement… “to protect, defend, indemnify and hold harmless” and noted that the agreement in this matter failed to use such language.  Combining the contract’s lack of specificity regarding attorney’s fees and noting that the American system of jurisprudence favored parties bearing their own costs and attorney’s fees unless otherwise agreed, the court found that attorney’s fees were not included in the agreement.  The court went on to state that a well-settled bright-line rule on the issue provided certainty in the law and would put parties on notice to include precise language on attorney fees when negotiating their contracts.

The lesson is to ensure that you’ve included or at least considered whether you want an attorney fee provision in your indemnification clause.  Although the court in this case seems to agree that the word “defend” added to the word indemnify may have made things come out differently, it would be best to specifically request the fees and/or costs that you want.

 

KAWASAKI MOTORS FINANCE v. VANAGAS, et al. (N.D. Ill., Doc. No. 07 C 5844)

Larger projects tend to offer better protections to contractors and owners through the issuance of sureties and bonds and the design professional is often left with the court system as the sole remedy for recouping payment either through an action for breach of contract, or to foreclose on a lien.  Smaller projects offer similar pitfalls for design professionals… and depending on the amounts owed, recouping the money can seem daunting.

 

In situations where the fee is a fraction of the total project cost, consider the personal guarantee.  It’s an additional agreement signed by an individual, not an LLC or a Corporation obligating the person to the debt owed.   

A recent case from the Northern District, Kawasaki Motors, deals with these types of guarantees (albeit in a motor vehicle financing setting) and is illustrative of the shorter method recoupment on the guarantee can take.

 

In Kawasaki, two individuals had signed personal guarantees for the debts of a corporation that had contracted with the plaintiff.  The corporation defaulted on its obligations and ended up owing roughly $76,000 to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff had a judgment against the corporation and then sought the money from the guarantors that had signed agreements with the plaintiff guaranteeing the debts of the corporation.  The defendants failed to contest the validity of the guaranties and the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on summary judgment finding that no issues of fact existed for trial where the contract for they guaranties was not contested and the defendants failed to put forward any reason to contest the amount claimed by the plaintiff.

 

Someone financing a project should be able to personally guaranty the 7% to 10% fee that the design professional will earn… especially on smaller commercial projects or residential ones.  Given that the design professional usually will have completed the majority of its work before financing problems arise, an extra guaranty for those taking such a risk is a welcomed safety net.

 

Kilpatrick v. Strosberg - The Court has Modified its Opinon

The background and facts of this matter can be found at our previously reported entry on the Kirkpatrick v. Strosberg opinion when it was handed down in April.  On August 8, the Appellate Court released a modified opinion in the matter and withdrew the previous opinion.

Of note, the new opinion adds an issue previously unaddressed by the court and changes the appellate court's ruling on a previous decision about punitive damages in the case.

1)       Upholding the trial court’s finding that the difference between the square footage depicted in their sales contracts and the square footage of the units as built did not amount to a breach of contract.   Contract language indicating that the floor plan measurements were approximations was included in a rider to the sales contracts that stated:

“All dimensions on the attached marked-up floor plan dated __ are approximate and subject o adjustments due to the actual location of piping, electrical, studs, steel bar joists, and other building components.”

The court also found that the architect’s construction drawings were incorporated into the contracts another provision in the agreement and used that fact to bolster the determination that the plans attached to the sales contracts were approximations.

2)       The Appellate court reversed its previous opinion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the trial court’s award of $300,000 in punitive damages where the plaintiffs did not establish a basis for computing compensatory or actual damages.  The court revised its opinion and stated that where the trial court expressly found that the plaintiff’s proved actual damages punitive damages would be allowed.  It then addressed the issue of the excessive nature of the $300,000 in punitive damages where no compensatory damages were awarded and held that the damages were not excessive and cited several cases including the Illinois Supreme Court’s Lowe decision (225 Ill.2d 456, 870 N.E.2d 303) encouraging courts to keep the ratio of punitive damages in the single digits.  Although the court had no compensatory damages to create a ration, the court found that an award of $83,000 in attorney’s fees in this matter compared in a 3.5 to 1 ration with the damages and was not excessive.

 

The court then affirmed the rest of the trial court’s determinations thus modifying its previous opinion to a full affirmation of the trial court’s findings by changing its decision about the award of punitive damages.

 

Lyerla v. AMCO Insurance Co., (7th Circ. Doc. No. 07-3104)

In a recent case from the Seventh Circuit the court found that no coverage existed in a CGL policy for a contractor sued by homeowners for breach of contract. (The opinion can be found here.)

 

The contractor had performed work on a residential project and the owners of the project sued him for breaching his construction contract by failing to complete the punchlist, and for liquidated damages guaranteed to them under the contract ($100 per day for every day the project went over the date required for completion of the punchlist items for the first 14 days and $150 for every day thereafter).  The contractor tendered the claim to his insurer and coverage was denied.  The contractor settled the suit with the owners for $53,000 and brought an action against the insurer for breach of contract and for violating the Illinois Insurance Code.  The insurer and the contractor both moved for summary judgment on the matter and the district court concluded that the underlying breach of contract claim filed by the owners had not alleged either an “occurrence” or “property damage” as defined in the contractor’s CGL policy.

 

The definitions in the policy were:

That insurer “will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” The policy:

applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if:

1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory”; and

2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs during the policy period.

“Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Property damage” is defined as:

a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or

b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the “occurrence” that caused it.

 

 

Lyerla v. AMCO Ins. Co., at 2 - 3.

 

 

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court’s decision and went on to note that Illinois law was replete with cases holding that allegations for breach of contract against an insured do not trigger coverage where the alleged defects resulting from the breach are considered the natural and ordinary consequences of the improper construction techniques of the contractor or its subs and therefore do not constitute “occurrences” within the definitions of most CGL policies.

The court also held that the damages alleged by the owners against the contractor for the costs they were forced to pay to complete the construction and the liquidated damages did not amount to “property damage” under the policy where they could not be considered damage to tangible property or damages resulting from “loss of use” by the owners.

 

The opinion serves to reaffirm the principal that the CGL policy doesn’t provide coverage for breach of contract claims and should put designers, contractors, and subs on notice that different policies should be procured if they would have coverage for these allegations.

 

 


 

Supreme Court Applies 10 Year Statute of Limitations to Indemnity Agreement

    A surety issues performance bonds to a contractor.  A third-party signs an indemnification agreement with the surety, agreeing to indemnify the surety for the payments made on the bonds.  The contractor breaches its contract for construction services and the surety pays out on the bonds.  The payments were made between 1994 and 1996.  The  surety demands payment, the third-party refuses and in 2004, the surety sues for breach of contract stating that the third-party has breached the indemnity agreement.

    That’s the start of the situation in Travelers Casualty & Surety Company v. James Bowman et al. (Ill. Sup. Ct. 2008, Doc. No. 103759).  The trial court dismissed the action of the surety, Travelers, finding that section 13-214(a) which applies a four-year statute of limitations to certain construction actions applied.  Travelers appealed and the appellate court held that the section 13-206 10 year statute of limitations applied to the action.

    For those interested, section 13-214(a) and 13-206 read in relevant part as follows and are important to anyone contracting in the construction setting as they are the statutes of limitations usually found applicable to actions arising from disputes over construction agreements:

  • 13-214(a)

“Actions based upon tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing an action, or his or her privity, knew or should reasonably have known of such act or omission. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, contract actions against a surety on a payment or performance bond shall be commenced, if at all, within the same time limitation applicable to the bond principal.”

  • 13-206

“[A]ctions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing … shall be commenced within 10 years next after the cause of action accrued…”

    Travelers asserted in the Supreme Court that the appellate court was right and that a 10 year statute of limitations was correct since they had brought a claim for breach of contract based on the indemnity agreement with the third-party.  The third-party claimed that either the four-year statute of limitations applied, or that an even shorter two-year statute of limitations for contribution and indemnity expressed under section 13-204 applied.

     The Supreme Court agreed with Travelers.  The court noted that it is the nature of the liability to which a person is subject and not the nature of the relief sought by a party is the test for determining the character of a cause of action.  In other words no matter what an attorney might call an action, it is the underlying nature of the action and the facts of the dispute that will determine what kind of action it is.

    Here, although construction omissions had led to the payment by Travelers on the bonds, the payment on the bonds triggered obligations under the separate indemnity agreements with the third-parties and when the third-party refused to pay under the indemnity agreements, Travelers had a cause of action against them for breach of contract.

    With regard to the second theory of a two-year statute of limitations, the Supreme Court held that the third-party was incorrect in claiming that any of its cases had ever held that a two year statute of limitations would ever apply to actions based on written indemnification agreements.  The court stated that the claims of indemnity and contribution addressed under the section 13-204 addressed “cases involving the allocation of damages in connection with an underlying tort claim for injury to person or property.”  It went on to state that such a claim based on indemnity was only for “implied indemnity” (where the law offers indemnity) not for the express indemnity (where the indemnity claim is based on an agreement providing that one party will indemnify the other). 

“In sum, section 13–204 is applicable to claims for implied indemnity involving allocation of damages in connection with an underlying tort claim for injury to person or property, regardless of whether subsection (a) or (b) is at issue. Section 13–204 is not applicable to claims for express indemnification based on a written contract. Because the claim at issue is based on a breach of express indemnification provisions in a written agreement, it is subject to the10-year limitations period in section 13–206.”  Slip. Op. at 12.

The court then held that the 10 year statute of limitation applied to the indemnity agreement.

A Construction Contract's Ambiguity Creating Third-Party Class Action Liability?

In Stewart v. Gino's East, et al. (N.D. IL, Doc. No. 07 C 6340), the defendants, restaurants that accept credit cards for payment, were sued under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) in a class action alleging they violated the FACTA by not removing the expiration dates of credit cards from their customer's receipts.  One of the defendants brought a third-party action against a company that installed the software and hardware used for the credit card transaction for breach of contract.  The third-party complaint attaches the contract.  It is a short agreement entitled "Construction Contract" and appears to be a standard contract used by the defendants for the contractor installing the equipment and allows the architect final approval on the remediation of unsatisfactory work.

credit card.jpg

The third-party complaint alleges that the description of the services provided in the contract meant that the contractor would assure that the software and hardware were in compliance with all applicable laws, including FACTA.  The contractor brought a motion to dismiss and argued that nothing in the contract obligated it to make sure the system was in compliance with FACTA and pointed to provisions of the contract arguing that they were not ambiguous and precluded a complaint against the contractor. 

The court found that the provisions pointed to by the contractor were silent about the system or hardware complying with FACTA (after all, it reads like a contract for the installation of the machines):

  • "You do hereby warrant, that all material and equipment supplied for this job shall be new and free from faults and defects, and standard written equipment warranties shall be included and delivered to owner and also included is an one year warranty (from completion of the contract work) on all workmanship and materials."

The court went on to hold that other provisions could be interpreted to mean that compliance with FACTA was included in the contract:

  • [the contractor] is "authorized to furnish all labor and equipment to do the POS set up for the building"
  • "[t]he work is intended to be complete and fully useable as a finished product or system."
  • "that all material and equipment supplied for this job shall be new and free from faults and defects."

Finding that these contractual provisions might be interpreted to require the system, as installed, would be compliant with FACTA.  The court denied the motion to dismiss, pointing out that these ambiguities created a question requiring future litigation.

Now, obviously, the court, and we, don't have all the facts about the nature of the agreement, but if it was just an agreement for the work on the installation of the equipment, then the ambiguities have created an issue and possible liability in a situation where absolutely none was intended.  Again, it might seem like a pain to have lawyers reviewing your agreements and helping negotiate even something as small as this contract must have seemed, but there is a reason such a big deal is made over contractual language.

Loman v. Freeman, and The Issue of Bailments


The Moorman Doctrine has been applied to those providing professional services since Anderson Electric, Inc., v. Ledbetter Erection Corp. 115 Ill. 2d 146 (1986).

The Doctrine has several exceptions but often forces parties to a contract for services to seek redress for damages they have incurred by suing on the terms of the contract rather than in tort.  The Moorman decision has long been a tool of attorneys representing construction clients for limiting the issues and available remedies of different parties to construction disputes.

In designing a building or performing work under contract on a structure, the doctrine often operates in limiting the manner in which a professional can be sued unless some error has resulted in damage to other property or personal injury or property damage resulting from a sudden and calamitous or dangerous occurrence.

In Loman v. Freeman, (Doc. No. 104289, April 17, 2008), the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to visit the "sudden or dangerous" exception to the doctrine in the scintillating context of veterinary medicine... and, sadly, decided against addressing the merits of the topic in favor of a procedural rule that bars consideration of arguments not adequately defined or argued in the briefs.  In Loman, the plaintiffs' race-horse required surgery.  Plaintiffs claimed they only authorized the vet to perform two procedures, and that a third procedure performed by the vet, was unauthorized and did irreparable damage to the horse, rendering it unfit for racing.  Plaintiffs sued on two theories, one in negligence claiming that the vet performed unauthorized surgery on the animal, and secondly on a count of conversion, claiming that the unauthorized surgery amounted to an unauthorized assumption of the right to possession or ownership of the horse.  We are concerned only with the first claim in negligence.

The defendants claimed that the Moorman Doctrine applied and that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing suit in negligence.  The district court agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs' case, the appellate court reversed the matter stating that the unauthorized surgery amounted to a sudden and dangerous occurrence under the Moorman Doctrine's exception; the defendants appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that the application of the "sudden and dangerous" exception to the conduct of the professional and not to the failure of a product contracted for was an awkward one, also pointing out that the application of the exception to veterinary surgery under this sort of theory could lead to the absurd result that veterinary surgery would fall under the exception, but veterinary practices resulting in, for example, misdiagnosis, would not.  The Court then went on to state that it would not consider the issue since it was not adequately briefed.

In his dissent, Justice Freeman pointed out something we often see in economic loss cases --confusion -- with half the opinion of the majority referred to the count as one in negligence, and half the opinion referred to a "contractual" relationship between the parties.  In providing assistance Justice Freeman pointed to the possibility that the court could reclassify the action as a contractual issue of bailment and proceeded to discuss the law of bailments and their contractual nature along with the bailment theory's ability to provide negligence-theory based relief in the contractual setting.  The issue is particularly interesting in that Justice Freeman argued that under a bailment scenario, a professional contracting to perform services is held to "exercise the proper degree of care and diligence about the work" (Slip Op. at 22) and notes that "generally, the bailee will be liable for losses that are proximately the result of the bailee's own negligence."

"Under the bailment, the bailee has a duty to exercise the skill or knowledge pertaining to the "nature of the business... Bailees will be liable for losses that result from their negligence or, more precisely, for their failure to exercise the skill or knowledge pertaining to the nature of their business."  (Slip Op. 23-24).

Justice Freeman went on to state that addressing the claim at issue under the bailments theory would arguably resolve every issue in the case.

Unfortunately, the Court decided not to address the "sudden and calamitous" issue.  Additionally, failing to fully flesh out the dicta concerning applying the exception to the acts of a person and not to something happening with the product will doubtlessly need to be addressed at some point.

Legal Fees In a Construction Dispute?... You're Not Alone.

John Parnass over at Washington Construction Law, an excellent Washington State Construction Law resource, is reporting on this article from the Law Blog of the Wall Street Journal.  The Donald is suing his attorneys over the fees they billed in representing him in a construction matter.

Great quotes from Trump regarding the underlying dispute and legal case over the breach of the earth-moving contract in the construction of a Golf Course:

"I have a Ph.D. in legal fees. I know when fees are fair and when they are not."

"Ninety percent of the conversations I had ... were about legal fees, not the case,"

"We won the case because I'm a great witness."

Whether or not they've got their own TV Show, clients should work with attorneys to establish a beneficial fee structure and ensure that they're getting value for their money.

Coverage for a Breach of Contract Action Under Illinois Law?

In Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Taylor Morley, Inc., (Doc. No. 06-cv-1035-MJR, S.D. Il, 2008) the Southern District of Illinois has issued a coverage opinion reaffirming the substantive Illinois law.   Construction defects alleged by a buyer against a builder and claims by buyers against a builder for diminished property values because of the builders failure to fulfill its contract and construct a "championship golf course" around which their homes were to have been built, are not afforded coverage under a CGL policy. 

Upholding the Contract for Indemnification

    A case from the Northern District (Smith v. The Village of Norridge), involving actions brought by an individual against the police, a landlord shopping center and its tenant, emphasizes the significance of indemnity provisions in a contract.

   At issue are cross-claims filed by the landlord of the facility arguing that the tenant is required to indemnify the landlord under a paragraph of the lease which reads that the tenant must:

"[i]ndemnify and save Landlord ... harmless from and defend against any and all demands,claims, actions, damages, costs and expenses, including [costs and attorneys' fees] arising from the conduct or management of the business conducted by Tenant."

  The lease contained a similar provision requiring the tenant to procure insurance for such acts and that the insurance was required to cover the landlord as well.  The cross-claims are pled as breach of contract actions stating the because the contract contains the indemnity provisions, the tenant's failure to indemnify (and obtain insurance in the second claim) amounts to a breach of the contract.

  The court disagreed with the tenants' argument that the Illinois Landlord-Tenant Act (765 ILCS 705/1(a)), which provides:

"(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), every covenant, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property, exempting the lessor from liability for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or resulting from the negligence of the lessor, his or her agents, servants or employees, in the operation or maintenance of the demised premises or the real property containing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable."

would bar this action.  The Court found that the provision would apply if the claim against the tenant had been one for indemnity for the negligent acts of the landlord.  However, the landlord pled an action for breach of contract, and the acts alleged as the root of the claims were intentional, so under two separate rationales, the ILTA did not apply.

 
  Accordingly, the court denied the tenant's motion to dismiss the cross claims.

 

Experts in Construction and Lease Terms

SWPlaza III, LLC v. TSA Stores, Inc., is a Central District opinion dealing with the termination of a lease in a shopping center after a tornado damaged the tenant's commercial store.  The lease contained a provision allowing the tenant to terminate the lease if the damage reached a specific percentage of the total reconstruction cost (35%); the tenant's estimate exceeded the percentage limit and it terminated the lease.  The landlord sought to enforce the lease and claimed that the estimates provided by the tenant were made in bad faith.  The Court held that a significant issue of fact existed regarding the propriety of the estimates.

  • In what will undoubtedly become a cited case should House Bill 5293 be passed amending the requirements and standards in Illinois for expert testimony, the Court went through an extensive analysis of the qualifications of a construction contractor providing estimates and his ability to offer testimony as an expert under Daubert.
Illinois Construction Blog

What Is The Nature of An Easement for Construction...

Call before you dig.jpgIn an interesting case which has applied the Illinois Supreme Court's recent Buenz decision, the appellate court found that an ordinance which included an indemnification provision would be read to apply against Nicor in favor of the Village of Wilmette where the ordinance the city passed granting a fifty year easement to Nicor to "place, maintain and operate its gas pipes under the streets of Wilmette, in consideration for which Nicor would provide gas for use by the Village."  While the court properly applied Buenz, it summarily dismissed an issue that likely should have garnered more attention:  The Illinois Construction Contract Indemnification for Negligence Act (740 ILCS 35/1 et seq.)  The court simply states that Nicor's authority for the proposition does not apply, but fails to offer any merit to the idea or state why it doesn't apply. 

By invoking Buenz, using the term "consideration" and even allowing the Village to argue that "its contract with Nicor included a provision indemnifying" the village for its own negligence...  (See page 3 of the opinion) certainly we have a contract.  Whether it's a contract for an easement or whether the contract can be said to touch on issues implicated by the anti-indemnification statute should have been explored by the court.  Or, if the court wanted to say that a contract for an easement, no matter what the activities allowed under the easement are, should not be construed as a contract or agreement for construction... then it should have done so.  Instead, we are left to wonder exactly what the rational for not applying the statute to the agreement between Nicor and Wilmette that includes maintenance of the wires was, when Section 1 of the anti-indemnification act states that it applies to contracts or agreements:

  • "With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private, for the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway bridge, viaducts or other work dealing with construction, or for any moving, demolition or excavation connected therewith, every covenant, promise or agreement to indemnify or hold harmless another person from that person's own negligence is void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable."



Sometimes a Suit Just Isn't Worth It.

The concept of having to obtain a surety bond shouldn't be of any new relevance to anyone doing public work.  Knowing the full extent of the provisions in the surety instrument and having a chance to properly negotiate might not seem all that important to a contractor who plans on completing its obligations.   Negotiating those terms or being aware of the full force of any personal indemnity provisions could be the difference between large-scale financial ruin and being able to get out of trouble with your reputation and bank account in tact.  On the flip-side, knowing whom you're granting surety to, and whether or not they're worth it is equally important.

The recited facts in United Fire v. Bartlett Bituminous should allow everyone to understand that the plaintiff will likely never see its money. (The defendants didn't even bother to respond to a motion for summary judgment.)  With the amount in controversy close to exceeding six million dollars, the point well taken is actually two-fold; one, sometimes you should cut your losses and know when you're sunk and two, performing research on the assets and background of the company you're dealing with is research worth doing.  A little foresight can go a long way.

The First District and a Landlord - Tenant Dispute Over Attorney's Fees.

In a decision sure to be pertinent to landlords and honing their pleadings in disputes with tenants, the First District has decided that attorney's fees should not be awarded in breach of contract actions against tenants.  After reading Willis v. NAICO Real Estate, perhaps landlords will want to consider exactly how and under what statutes/agreements they look to recoup money from tenants.

Registering The Copyright

©    Maintaining the copyright in a design can give an architect or engineer another tool in ensuring payment and completion of the contract.  The right to come in and take back the designs or to seek an injunction has teeth and copyright is a limited issue in most standard form contracts.  While disputes based on the licenses and the copyright terms of the contract carry meat, the A/E might consider registering their plans with the US Copyright Office prior to turning them over to other parties.

        Having the protection of the registered copyright allows for the statutory provisions of US Copyright law to be used as well as seeking the remedy under the contract and can offer the added benefit of allowing the A/E to seek to recoup statutory damages as well as legal fees.  A short primer is available from the office, and the limited fee, especially on designs that may be used multiple times can offer an added assurance that payment in full will occur.  

IS THERE A NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE CONSENSUSDOCS?

The new ConsensusDOCS forms were published late last year and will be the subject of the ABA Construction Industry Forum's 2008 Fall Meeting.  With all the buzz we thought it would be pertinent to sit down and read these documents.  This posting is one of many expected to come regarding the new ConsensusDOCS.

            The language implying a fiduciary duty hasn't changed much over the years and is often described by the courts as a "relationship of trust and confidence" between parties.  With that definition entrenched in case law we thought it a bit peculiar that the normal contracting relationship between an architect and an owner would be particularly described as one of "trust and confidence" in ConsensusDOCS 240 section 2.2. 

In the construction setting, plaintiff's with claims have been seeking to impose a fiduciary relationship in one form or another on contractors and architects to gain more damages and a heightened standard of care for some time.  Thankfully, many courts have often struck down the concept of parties contracting for construction services as entering into a fiduciary relationship thus allowing plaintiff's to bring causes of action outside the normal breach of contract claim or based on a heightened standard of care.  (See, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1004; 812 F. Supp. 72)

With the concept of "trust and confidence" and its implication of a fiduciary relationship in mind, it's odd that the ConsensusDOCS Guidebook from October 31, 2007, would explicitly delineate that the contracting parties should not be agreeing to a heightened standard of care:

  • "Standard of Care (Section 2.1): A definition of the standard of care applicable to architectural and engineering services performed under this Agreement is not included in this Agreement (previous additions of AGC contracts did include such a definition). The drafters of the new Consensus documents determined that it would be better for the design professionals to be held to a standard imposed on them by their own profession, rather than one defined by this Agreement.
  • "Contractors and Owners should not modify this Agreement by adding language that would hold any design professional to a standard of care that is above that which is customary and normal for design professionals in the same time and location, because that might result in the unintended consequence of voiding errors and omissions coverage available to the respective design professionals."

 
But then go on to say that the A/E is accepting a relationship of trust and confidence in Section 2.1 of document 240:

 

  • "Relationship of the Parties (Section 2.2): This provision requires the Architect/Engineer (A/E) to accept the relationship of trust and confidence in exercising its skill and judgment in furthering the interests of the Owner and expressly affirms the A/E's representation that it possesses the requisite skill, expertise, and licensing to perform the required services. The new language is preferable, but it should be noted that it was not included in the previous AGC 240 Owner-Designer professional Agreement, no longer published."

       It is also a bit boggling that understanding the implication of the "trust and confidence" language, that no other provision in the document would specifically state that nothing in the contract should be construed as creating a fiduciary relationship between the parties.  Perhaps the authors just thought such a provision unnecessary given the lack of case law supporting a fiduciary relationship in such a setting.  But why then be specific as to the language of "trust and confidence" between the parties?  Why not just state that the parties agree to "good faith and fair dealing" or accept a "contractual relationship for the provision of A/E services"?  And, even if a standard of care is not affected by the language, could "trust and confidence" through its fiduciary implications mean that there are now added duties that the A/E must be aware of?

Subrogee to the general or to the subs?

            This is an interesting decision from the Northern District, the plaintiff, a surety company paid out on bonds to subcontractors when the bank that a general had deposited the money into took the funds the general had for payment to the subs to satisfy the general's obligations to the bank.

            The surety had three theories, conversion, a claim for a trust under the mechanic's lien act, and constructive trust.  The court found that because the surety was not suing as subrogee to the general, but rather as subrogee on the funds it paid out to the subs and because it had failed to allege that the bank had knowledge that the funds were for the subcontractors none of the counts could lie.  The Court also held that the bank was not implicated or obligated under the terms of the mechanic's lien act.

            While it initially looks like the failure of the plaintiff to properly plead the facts necessary to maintain the claim resulted in the dismissal, much of the language used implied that in order to maintain the actual claims, the surety should step in as subrogee to the general and not to the sub. 

Read the back of those Purchase Orders!

    These pesky forum selection clauses keep popping up, but in this interesting twist, the court is now enforcing them when they're not part of the original contract or negotiations with someone, but arrive after work has been started on the back of a purchase order.  In Compass Environmental, Inc. v. Polu Kai Services, LLC, it was Polu Kai's fault for not objecting to or raising an issue about the forum selection clause printed on the back of a purchase order.  But, even if they had, what were they to do when they had already started work on the project?  Would it be an actionable repudiation if Polu Kai had just walked, four days into its job, after it received its purchase order and didn't like the terms printed on the back... terms which weren't negotiated between the parties beforehand and now appear to be deemed accepted unless action is taken?

Contractor Prompt Payment Act... Can you really contract around it?

            We haven't seen as much discussion as would seem to be merited by the provisions of the Illinois Contractor Prompt Payment Act (815 ILCS 603/1 et seq.).   This act has written itself into every construction contract in the State of Illinois (excepting public works, single family homes and buildings with fewer than 12 family units, of course).  This lack of constructive commenting is likely because the Act didn't become law until August 31, 2007.  However, from the comments and criticisms we have seen, there's an extremely important and sure to be contested issue that needs to be addressed:  Is it possible to "opt" out of the provisions of the Act?

The original version of the House Bill (HB 0743) that introduced what later became the Act included language at the beginning of Section 10 which read:

  • "Construction contracts.  All construction contracts shall be deemed to provide the following unless they expressly exclude the provisions of this Act"

            This provision was the sole subject of Senate Committee Amendment No. 1, which was adopted by the Senate and the House and incorporated into the Act and struck the "unless they expressly exclude the provisions of this Act" language from the Act.

            This creates a strong argument for anyone wishing to claim that it was the express intent of the legislature to not allow parties to "opt" out of the act.  Combine this with the ideas that the public policy of the act was to ensure prompt payment to contractors and subs as defined by the Mechanic's Lien act; to allow contractors and subs an additional recourse should payments not be forthcoming; to shorten the time it takes for payment and approval of work, and we end up with a decent case that parties could end up contracting around the act for naught.



Forced to litigate in Florida?

            For those out-of-state contractors, architects, and builders working on projects in some other place for Illinois' residents, there are some interesting lessons in the Fourth District's Isringhausen v. Prime Contractors and Associates, Inc., opinion regarding keeping yourselves from being subjected to Illinois law.

            It should come as no surprise that a Florida company working on building a house in Florida that was contacted and did no business in Illinois was not subject to Illinois jurisdiction.  But, what if the Florida contractor was advertising here in Illinois, or had made a few trips to Illinois to complete the contract?  What if the escrow or some other portion of the contract were to be completed in Illinois so that the contractor, although minimally, were availing itself of Illinois law?  It would be wise to work out the full details for out-of-state construction both for owners in Illinois and contractors elsewhere, lest the parties find themselves in costly litigation hundreds or even thousands of miles away.

Bench-Trial Agreements Upheld...

    Yesterday's Seventh Circuit opinion, IFC Credit v. United Business, should be of interest to anyone out there contracting and agreeing to waive a trial by jury.  The Court found that state law will control a determination about the validity of bench-trial agreements (jury-waiver clauses) in federal cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. 

    Apparently, it may create a possible circuit split between the Courts as well. 

    The failure to have an attorney review or negotiate the terms of a contract appear to no longer be a decent defense to jury-waiver clauses.