As we continue to follow HB 2094, we are pleased to present the
1907 edition of the Structural Work Act. We'd like to thank our friends over at the Cook County Law Library for having an in-tact copy of the 1908 Code. The spine of the book can be seen to the left.
As you can see, not much is different between the
HB 2094 proposed act and the 1907 version. Except the penalties. It used to be that the penalty for violation could cost an architect $25 to $200, now it would be a "petty offense."
In one of the cases that established the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule exercised for 4th Amendment violations (United States v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1985)), Justice Blackmun delivered a concurring opinion addressing decisions based on empirical data and offered some guidance regarding how the law should approach its own determinations when they are premised on empirical evidence:
"As the Court's opinion in this case makes clear, the Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule because of an empirical judgment that the rule has little appreciable effect in cases where officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on search warrants. Because I share the view that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally compelled corollary of the Fourth Amendment itself, I see no way to avoid making an empirical judgment of this sort, and I am satisfied that the Court has made the correct one on the information before it. Like all courts, we face institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about "legislative facts," and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of police officers in the absence of such a rule. Nonetheless, we cannot escape the responsibility to decide the question before us, however imperfect our information may be, and I am prepared to join the Court on the information now at hand.
"What must be stressed, however, is that any empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one. By their very nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in stone. To the contrary, they now will be tested in the real world of state and federal law enforcement, and this Court will attend to the results. If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct demands no less."
If the Supreme Court of the United States can recognize that empirical evidence can lead to the need to reconsider its own rules then, when:
"It is the intent of the General Assembly that this Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its beneficial purpose of protecting persons engaging in occupations of working in and about construction, repairing, alteration, or removal of buildings, bridges, viaducts, and other structures. This liberal interpretation exists so as to provide workers with a safe place to work and to afford relief to injured workers."
a state legislature drafting a law designed for a purpose (Worker Safety) should also revisit its law with empirical evidence and determine if the standards set out in that law can accomplish that goal. The point is exacerbated by the fact that Structural Work Act was in effect from 1907 to 1995. There should be plenty of data out there to determine if the standards and rules set forth by this statute should be updated.
The real question then is, have methods, means and ability of contractors and construction trades to provide for safety changed such that the standards should be augmented? Is it sound law that the physical requirements of structures under the act should just read as they did in 1907, given that the industry has advanced? What about OSHA requirments?
