The Home Repair and Remodeling Act Does Not Apply to Subcontractors

In MD Electrical Contractors, Inc., v. Fred Abrams (Il. Sup. Ct. 2008; Doc. No. 104000)  the plaintiff had sued under the theory of quantum meruit, stating that it had no contract with the defendant for electrical work performed on the defendant's home.  The defendant claimed that the Home Repair and Remodeling Act prohibited a suit by the plaintiff.  The circuit court had reasoned that quantum meruit was a legal theory that implied a contract where none existed.  Since the Home Repair and Remodeling Act was against the contract, and the subcontactor fell under it, the court could not imply a contract where the act would forbid such a contract.  The Appellate Court had disagreed and remanded the decision.  And now, the Supreme Court's decision has squarely stated that the act does not apply to subcontractors.

  • The Home Repair and Remodeling Act applies only to those who contract directly with the Home Owner.

The court refused to address the intriguing issue of whether or not a sub-contractor could have any recourse in quantum meruit, or outside the Mechanic's Lien Statute.

In a strong-toned dissent, Justice Freeman points out that the complaint was insufficient on its face to offer the factual issues that the court relied upon in determining this matter.  The complaint asserts that MD Electrical was a sub-contractor, but there is no evidence of that fact anywhere in the record.  The dissent goes on to argue that the court did not have to reach the issue of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act's application to sub-contractors and should not have done so.

Mechanic's Liens, Mechanic's Liens

    It's not often that we get a 97 page opinion from an appellate court, even more rare is the occasion that any such opinion would be of interest to the industry.  This week, we were happy to find both in Cordeck Sales, Inc., v. Construction Systems, Inc., et al., (Doc. No. 1-06-3702, 1st Dist).

    In Cordeck, a developer had gone belly-up on a multi-million dollar condo development.  Multiple mechanics liens were filed by the various entities involved in the construction for work performed, the lender filed a claim to foreclose its mortgage, and a receiver had been appointed to sell the individual units and collect the proceeds into a pot from which the resolved disputes would be compensated.  The opinion doesn't go too far in creating any substantively new nuances to the statute that Representative George Scully has called "a patchwork of quilts...of patches put on this quilt over the past hundred years" (Slip op. at 44).  Some clarifications and holdings are still important.  Of interest are:

  • A reminder that the dates of the contracts are the attachment dates for the liens of contractors and subs.  They will be instrumental in establishing the priority of liens against third parties and other claimants.
  • The date of recordation for a mortgage will establish the date of a mortgage for the determination of priority in the scheme of liens and claims against third parties.
  • Construction Managers can have liens, even on contracts prior to the 2004 and 2006 amendments to the Act.
  • Amendments to a recorded lien for amounts of work done over time past the date of the first recorded lien can still affect the assertions of rights against the owner, but may not have affect as to the right in priority or assertions against third parties.
  • Fees earned on a project are not inherently "unalienable."

Of note to many practitioners:

  • If a deponent is claiming a fifth-amendment right against self incrimination in answer to questions, the determination regarding the propriety of such an assertion will be made on a question by question basis in the trial court.

Is the Benefit Worth The Risk For A General Contractor to Get Involved in Safety?

   


        In this recent opinion from the First District, the Court has upheld that a general's control through asserting its authority to stop work due to safety violations by its sub; the mandate that the sub hold weekly safety meetings and submit the minutes of those meetings for the general's review; and the subs contractual obligation to submit a site-specific safety plan all amount to enough retained control to present an issue of fact as to the general's liability under §414 of the restatement of torts.

            §414 states in relevant part that:

            "One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care."

            In the case of Wilkerson v. Schwendener (1-06-2653) the plaintiff was the employee of a sub and was placing some joists on a second floor of a retirement home project when his co-worker handed him a joist and struck him in the foot.

            The general had won summary judgment on the issue of §414 liability where it claimed to not have retained control of its subs work.  The Court found that the general had retained control where it required its sub to (1) comply with a 21 part list of safety regulations generated by the general; (2) hold weekly safety meetings and submit the minutes of those meetings; (3) prepare and submit a site-specific safety plan; and (4) attend the general's weekly safety meetings.  Additionally, at some point prior to the plaintiff's accident the general had sent a letter to the sub stating that the sub needed to get its safety program in order or the general "WILL STOP" (yes, it was all caps in the actual letter) the sub from continuing its work.

            The Court noted that generally, just having a supervisory role over safety would not have implicated the general in §414 liability, but here, with all the factors taken into account, and the threat of stopping the work if safety was not performed properly, the general did retain sufficient control and with it, liability.

            This raises some interesting questions regarding safety.  We know that a general wants to eliminate workplace accidents and that if it is not in charge of workplace safety, its subs might not toe the line (as here).  We also know that a general can't be everywhere at once on a job site.  So what should a general do now?  Should they be standing back and not getting involved in safety programs and full-on supervision?  Would that increase the number of accidents, but shield generals from liability under §414?  It seems a bit ridiculous that because a general was concerned with safety (preventing accidents) and interceded in different ways to increase safety (increase the prevention of accidents) that it should be held to be liable under §414 where its sub didn't have adequate safety in place in order to protect its own employees but where it did try to get the sub to conform to the plan and put adequate protections in place.  If the general hadn't had a plan and hadn't butted in, and hadn't threatened to stop the subs work, the accident would have happened, probably sooner, but it would be able to stand back and have a better argument against §414 liability.  The general didn't control all the safety, and unless there's a reason to believe that the sub would have put in place different and better safety measures than it could under the general's program, it's a bit ridiculous to say that the general should be at fault because it took certain steps to get the safety program of its lackadaisical subcontractor.

Contractor Prompt Payment Act... Can you really contract around it?

            We haven't seen as much discussion as would seem to be merited by the provisions of the Illinois Contractor Prompt Payment Act (815 ILCS 603/1 et seq.).   This act has written itself into every construction contract in the State of Illinois (excepting public works, single family homes and buildings with fewer than 12 family units, of course).  This lack of constructive commenting is likely because the Act didn't become law until August 31, 2007.  However, from the comments and criticisms we have seen, there's an extremely important and sure to be contested issue that needs to be addressed:  Is it possible to "opt" out of the provisions of the Act?

The original version of the House Bill (HB 0743) that introduced what later became the Act included language at the beginning of Section 10 which read:

  • "Construction contracts.  All construction contracts shall be deemed to provide the following unless they expressly exclude the provisions of this Act"

            This provision was the sole subject of Senate Committee Amendment No. 1, which was adopted by the Senate and the House and incorporated into the Act and struck the "unless they expressly exclude the provisions of this Act" language from the Act.

            This creates a strong argument for anyone wishing to claim that it was the express intent of the legislature to not allow parties to "opt" out of the act.  Combine this with the ideas that the public policy of the act was to ensure prompt payment to contractors and subs as defined by the Mechanic's Lien act; to allow contractors and subs an additional recourse should payments not be forthcoming; to shorten the time it takes for payment and approval of work, and we end up with a decent case that parties could end up contracting around the act for naught.